Ownership and Control Divergence on Firm Value


  • Irfah Najihah Basir Malan Institute of Business Excellence, Arshad Ayub Graduate Business School, Faculty of Business Management, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
  • Norhana Salamudin Institute of Business Excellence, Arshad Ayub Graduate Business School, Faculty of Business Management, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
  • Noryati Ahmad Institute of Business Excellence, Arshad Ayub Graduate Business School, Faculty of Business Management, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia


Pyramid structure, firm value, cash flow right, control right, Attig Model, Malaysia


The aim of this study is to provide an empirical evidence of the implication of pyramid firm towards firm value. Previous research have documented that in many East Asian firms, the ultimate owners showed a dispersion in actual ownership and control due to ownership concentration in pyramid firm leading to expropriation of minority shareholders’ interest. The study adapts the model by Attig using Malaysian pyramidal firms for the period 1990 to 2010. The results reveal that pyramid structure may have detrimental influence on  firm value  particularly for low cash flow right (CFR) ratio firms. Future research needs to focus on identifying the heterogeneous factors that improve the generalizability of the research.


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How to Cite

Irfah Najihah Basir Malan, Norhana Salamudin, & Noryati Ahmad. (2022). Ownership and Control Divergence on Firm Value. Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, 4(1), 78–85. Retrieved from https://ijcms.in/index.php/ijcms/article/view/516